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The Commercialization of College Football: The
Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia Learn an
Antitrust Lesson in NCAA v. Board of Regents
The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 culminated a period of social, eco-
nomic, political and ideological growth. Fundamental to the Act was a com-
mitment to consumer welfare and antipathy to trusts. The Act attempted to
break up the large monopolies and their restraint of trade. In the process it
gained central importance to federal antitrust policy. When the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was formed fifteen years later, one of its
goals was to regulate amateur sports. Three quarters of a century after its in-
ception, the NCAA was held to have violated the Sherman Act in NCAA v.
Board of Regents. The United States Supreme Court found the NCAA 's college
football television plan anticompetitive and affirmed relief granted in the
lower courts enjoining the NCAA from further regulation of telecasts under
the plan. The effect of the decision has been to create chaos among college
football-playing universities. On the other hand, it has created excitement
among college football fans.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal antitrust policy is largely centered around three statutes:
the Sherman Act of 1890;1 the Clayton Act;2 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914.3 The Sherman Act contains two major pro-
visions.4 Violations of the Act may be enforced by the state through
criminal proceedings,5 or may be enforced by private parties.6 Each
provision has identical penalties but different emphasis. Section one
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2. Id. §§ 12-27 (1976). President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated, "The Sherman and
Clayton Acts have become as much a part of the American way of life as the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution." Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of
State Cordell Hull (September 6, 1944), reprinted in H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST POLICY iii (1955).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
4. Id. §§ 1, 2. Section one states in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Section two states in pertinent part: "Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. "
5. Criminal penalties may be severe. Corporations may pay up to one million dol-
lars in penalties. Imprisonment for up to three years and fines up to one hundred
thousand dollars may be imposed on individuals. 1 J. VoN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAW AND TRADE REGULATION § 1.01 (Desk ed. 1984).
6. Private parties are given motivation to litigate by the liberal compensation
under sections one and two. If successful, the party may be compensated in full for
focuses on unreasonable restraints of trade which could possibly lead
to monopoly power. Section two focuses on the use of monopoly
power. 7
The controversy in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents 8 centered on a relatively narrow issue of antitrust
law. The question of whether section one of the Sherman Act 9 was
violated by the NCAA's college football telecast and cablecast regula-
tions is one of relatively small impact on substantive law.1O The
Court's holding that the NCAA's economic procedures violated the
Sherman Act signaled a continued application of antitrust law to
nonprofit and amateur associations.1 ' Whereas the majority consid-
ered the NCAA a commercial industry thereby subject to trade regu-
lation,12 the dissent viewed the NCAA as an educational institution
designed to promote amateurism. The holding of the case sent notice
to amateur and nonprofit organizations to keep a close eye on their
business practices.
II. THE LAW-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Sherman Act embodies a philosophy that was directly influ-
enced by public opinion of the 1890's. 13 The antitrust policy formed
in the period between 1890 and 1911 has changed from a negative
anti-trust approach to a positive aim of instituting economic plan-
ning.14 Nevertheless, the current rationale in antitrust policy is the
same as it was in the past; free enterprise must be enforced and mar-
kets must remain open and competitive.' 5
the cost of the lawsuit and reasonable attorney's fees. In addition, treble damages may
be granted. Id.
7. Section two includes conduct which is generally a violation of section one per
se, however, a section one violation does not always violate section two.
8. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
10. The Court found that the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
was the predominant organization of universities in the United States. Although there
are other amateur athletic organizations in the United States, the Court's fact finding
was limited to particular aspects of the NCAA's television plan and therefore will
probably have no direct impact on amateur and nonprofit organizations. 104 S. Ct. at
2954.
11. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee
schedule published by a county bar association and enforced by the state bar associa-
tion violates section one of the Sherman Act); Comment, Antitrust and Non Profit En-
tities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1981).
12. 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
13. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 54.
14. A.D. NEALE & D. GOYER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 16 (3d ed. 1980).
15. Id. at 441. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). For a
general discussion of the development of antitrust policy, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX (1978).
[Vol. 12: 515, 1985] NCAA v. Board of Regents
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act is a vague, general statute.16 Its definition has
been provided by a large body of decisions.17 If read literally the Act
would invalidate most types of agreements, because most agreements
concerning trade involve some type of restraint.18 In the landmark
case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States,19 the Court construed sec-
tion one as effective against unreasonable restraints of trade.
1. Elements of a Section One Violation 2 0
Four elements make up a civil violation of section one: "(1) At
least two persons must act together. This requirement relates to the
statutory language, 'contract, combination ... or conspiracy.' (2)
There must be a restraint of 'trade' or 'commerce.' (3) The trade or
commerce must be among the several states or with foreign nations.
(4) The restraint must be unreasonable."2 '
Section one does not regulate the activities of a single entity.22
Subentities need not have voluntarily participated in an unlawful
16. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 164. "The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were
not stated in terms of precision or of crystal clarity and the Act itself does not define
them." Id.
17. R. BORK, supra note 15, at 73-89.
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court reviewed the common law rules relating to re-
straints of trade and the legislative history of the Sherman Act. Id. at 10. It concluded
that Congress did not intend to prohibit all contracts or even those contracts that
caused insignificant restraints of trade. Id. at 63. The principle that unreasonable re-
straints of trade are the only kind prohibited by § 1 is a basic tenet of antitrust law.
See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-90
(1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
20. The Court's holding in NCAA examined only sect ion one of the Act.
21. 1 J. VON KALINSOWSKI, supra note 5, at § 3.02. In criminal cases the additional
element of criminal intent must be present. Id.
22. Id. at § 3.02[1]. The "single entity" defense is commonly used. Whether the
company is a single enterprise or separate entities may be either a question of law or
fact. The seventh, eighth, and ninth circuits consider thu question as one of fact. See
Oglilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa
Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); Photovest
Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917
(1980). The third and fifth circuits hold the question as one of law. See Columbia
Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33-34 & n.49 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H & B Equipment Co. v. International Har-
vester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978). In NCAA, the Court found that the
NCAA was not a single entity, thus signaling to other sports leagues that the single
entity defense is not viable. 104 S. Ct. at 2958.
scheme or plan to challenge its legitimacy. 23 The terms "contract,
combination or conspiracy" infer concerted action.24 Concerted activ-
ity in "trade" and "commerce" has been broadly defined as all com-
mercial activity which involves interstate or foreign commerce. 25
Transactions constitute interstate commerce if they are either actu-
ally in the flow of commerce or have an effect on the flow of com-
merce.26 An unlawful restraint of interstate commerce is one that is
unreasonable in light of the relevant market.27 Under section one an
unreasonable restraint may be determined by one of two approaches:
the per se approach; or the rule of reason approach.28
2. The Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches
A restraint which is inherently anticompetitive is a per se violation
of section one.29 If found to exist, restraints such as horizontal price
fixing, vertical price fixing, tying arrangements, horizontal division of
markets, reciprocal dealing and boycotts are all presumed violations
and no further proof of their unreasonableness is needed. 30 The per
se approach has recently been limited in its application to traditional
antitrust violations. Cases of first impression or new developments in
a field should be considered under the rule of reason approach.31
A detailed restatement of the long-standing rule of reason ap-
proach3 2 was recently made in National Society of Professional Engi-
neers v. United States.33 The Court stated that reasonableness must
be determined in light of the relevant economic market in which the
23. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 5, at § 3.02[l] & n.5.
24. Id. at § 3.02[2].
25. Id. at § 3.02[4]. Several areas of trade and commerce are exempt from the Act.
Agriculture, insurance and labor have limited exemption. State action has restricted
immunity, as does private lobbying, to stimulate legislation (otherwise known as the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine). Banks and industries which are administratively regu-
lated have limited exemption. Export associations may also have limited exemption.
Id. at 3.02[4][a].
26. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 24-25 (2d ed. 1984).
27. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 5, at § 3.02[6].
28. See 356 U.S. at 5.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal
division of markets held per se illegal); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U.S. 384 (1951) (horizontal price fixing held per se illegal); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (vertical price fixing held per se ille-
gal); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (reciprocal dealing held per se ille-
gal); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements
held per se illegal); United States v. American Linseed Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (combi-
nation to limit individual member's right to contract is a restraint of trade).
31. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The position of the decision
written by Justice White is consistent with his dissent in NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2971
(White, J., dissenting).
32. The rule of reason was formulated in 1911 in Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 1. See
supra note 19.
33. 435 U.S. at 679, 689-90.
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restraint occurred. Definition of the relevant market is a central is-
sue on which a case may succeed or fail.34 Violations which are per
se illegal by definition are inherently unreasonable. If a case involves
both sections one and two, a threshold finding under the per se or
rule of reason approach of price fixing will probably be sufficient evi-
dence of illegality so that further section two issues need not be
pursued.35
Price fixing agreements between competitors (horizontal), and by
various entities in the chain of distribution (vertical), are unreasona-
ble restraints.36 Even if price fixing is proven, the Court will adopt
the rule of reason approach if the case presents a novel situation and
the market restraints exist for a procompetitive purpose.37 Some
markets would not exist without reasonable restraints. 38 Thus, in-
stead of lobbying for exemption from the antitrust trade regulations,
some industries may attempt to institute reasonable procompetitive
restrictions. The holding of NCAA v. Board of Regents provides spe-
cific reasonableness guidelines which should be helpful to amateur
and nonprofit institutions in determining what restraints they should
maintain.39
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner, NCAA, is a nonprofit, self-regulatory organiza-
tion.40 It was created in response to abuses occurring in intercollegi-
ate athletics near the turn of the century.41 Today it is made up of
34. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 5, at § 3.02[6][b].
35. 104 S. Ct. at 2957-60 & n.12.
36. Price fixing agreements of any kind, whether they fix minimum or maximum
price are illegal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466
(1982).
37. See Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Conn., Inc., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982).
38. 104 S. Ct. at 2961 ("what is critical is that this case involves an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be avail-
able at all").
39. Id. at 2973 (White, J., dissenting).
40. The NCAA operates by a constitution and its bylaws, subject to amendment by
its members. New policy is often made at annual meetings. When not in session, pol-
icy is made by 22 elected members. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. NCAA,
546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (1982). The purpose of the NCAA i:.; to ensure student athletes
and athletic programs remain "an integral part" of the overall educational program.
See CONSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N,
art. IV, § 3, reprinted in MANUAL OF THE NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N 22-23
(1977-78).
41. Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L. J.
655, 656 (1978) ("This period was marked by numerous abuses, including commercial-
some 775 public and private universities and more than 100 athletic
conferences. 42 The NCAA enforces extensive regulations, from rules
of play to recruiting and the size of coaching staffs.4 3 At issue in
NCAA v. Board of Regents are the NCAA's telecast and cablecast
rules.44
The NCAA's television plans have consisted of the same basic fea-
tures since 1951. 4 5 To develop a plan, a questionnaire was sent to the
membership and the resulting plan was voted on by mail referen-
dum. This procedure occurred annually until 1977. In 1977, the
NCAA changed the process of formulating a plan to use "principles
of negotiation," 46 instead of consulting the membership for approval.
ism, excessive physical injury to student athletes, and cheating by some participating
schools"). The abuses found today are much the same. See, e.g., The Campus Pros,
L.A. Times, June 28, 1984, § 7 (Opinion), at 2, col. 1.
42. Brief for Petitioner at 2, 104 S. Ct. at 2954. In the 20 year period between 1950
and 1970, NCAA membership increased 128%. J. WEISTART, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 760
(1979).
43. Note, supra note 41, at 657-60. The NCAA Enforcement Program has broad
authority to impose sanctions on its members. After notice and a hearing, a violator
may face exclusion from specified NCAA championships and regular season play. Pre-
vious to the ruling discussed here (104 S. Ct. at 2948), the NCAA's broadest power was
exclusion from television broadcasts. Where the NCAA has no authority to discipline,
it enforces violations by threatening sanctions against the institution, thereby making
the school discipline individual athletes and coaches. It has been argued that these
sanctions constitute a concerted refusal to deal, and in the case of television, economic
boycott. So far, the enforcement of the regulations has been upheld in the courts.
Note, supra note 41, at 662-63.
44. The NCAA does not regulate the telecasts of any sport but football. College
basketball is unregulated, as is college hockey, both of which are periodically televised.
546 F. Supp. at 1284.
45. "The 1951-1953 television plans were submitted to the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice for review. The Department took the matter 'under study'
...and, until this litigation, has apparently never taken the position that the NCAA's
television plans were unlawful." 104 S. Ct. at 2973, n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
Although television plans were in effect from 1951 on, it wasn't until 1971 that the
NCAA gained formal power under the NCAA Constitution to regulate telecasts. By-
law 11-3-(aa) was adopted in 1971, thereby granting the Association power to regulate
telecasts, but not cablecasts. The NCAA television plan was designed to reduce the
effects of telecasts on gate attendance. NCAA members were split into divisions, divi-
sion I being the major athletic powers. Division I has two subdivisions, I-A and I-AA.
Division I-A schools have major athletic programs, whereas the rest of the members in
other divisions may not compete at all, or at varying levels. Division II and III institu-
tions could televise whatever games they wished as long as they were not broadcast on
a major network. The amount a team was paid varied per division, I-A being the high-
est priced. A "minimum aggregate price" was set for all of the games, which was di-
vided among the schools per division ranking. The NCAA retained 8% for funding of
its activities. 546 F. Supp. at 1289.
46. 546 F. Supp. at 1283-84. The "principles of negotiation" were the same as the
original controls imposed by the 1951 plan. NCAA members were allowed only a lim-
ited number of appearances over a certain time period. Certain "exception telecasts"
were allowed if approved by the NCAA. The plan also included a "supplementary se-
ries" of games. In summary, the plan granted exclusive rights to the broadcaster be-
cause it limited the amount of games televised and it limited the amount of games any
one school could televise. No member could sell its television rights except under the
NCAA plan. Id.
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The new television plan granted the American Broadcasting Com-
pany (ABC) exclusive rights to telecasts for the 1978-1981 seasons.47
A number of athletic conferences are members of the NCAA. One
of them, the College Football Association (CFA), formed in 1977,
consists of schools from five major football playing conferences, in-
cluding the respondents, Oklahoma and Georgia.48 Initially the
CFA's purpose was to lobby for the interests of its schools at NCAA
annual meetings. Because all 785 NCAA members have an equal
vote on football regulation and telecast issues, the CFA did not feel
its interests were well represented. Dissatisfaction with the NCAA
structure led to CFA investigation into its own broadcasting con-
tracts.49 The CFA and the NCAA both negotiated with television
companies in anticipation of the end of the 1978-1981 contract with
ABC. The NCAA responded by issuing an "official interpretation" of
its bylaws stating that it had exclusive telecast and cablecast rights
over its member institutions.50
In 1981, the CFA contracted with NBC for the exclusive right to
televise CFA games. 51 The NCAA reacted by making it known that
sanctions would be imposed on the CFA schools if they did not con-
form to the NCAA television plan.52 The CFA initiated this suit in
the federal district court to enjoin the NCAA from imposing sanc-
tions on the CFA and attempting to nullify the NBC contract. In-
junctive relief was granted in September of .1981. Meanwhile, the
CFA and NCAA continued the dispute at the 1982 annual convention
and a special convention. The membership of the NCAA responded
to the CFA action by reaffirming the NCAA's exclusive television
rights and ratifying the proposed television plan for 1982-1985.53
47. Id. at 1283. In 1978, ABC paid a "minimum aggregate fee" of 29 million dol-
lars. The method of determining the minimum aggregate fee is unclear. Thomas Han-
sen, NCAA Television Program Director, "suggested" the minimum amount to ABC.
To figure out prices per broadcast he "worked out various combinations" until the
prices, when multiplied, equaled the aggregate. Id. at 1289.
48. Id. at 1285. Most CFA members are Division I-A schools. Division I contains
275 schools, and less than 190 of them play football. Id.
49. Id. at 1286.
50. Id. The "official interpretation" was adopted by a vote of all NCAA members
at the 1982 annual convention. Id.
51. Id. The CFA-NBC plan was an adoption of the satme type of plan the NCAA
had used. It provided for a limited number of appearances and a minimum aggregate
fee. The difference between the CFA agreement and the NCAA agreement was the
larger amount of money and more liberal appearance schedule. Id.
52. Id. Several high-ranking NCAA officials made it clear that sanctions would be
swift and might affect the school's entire athletic program, not just football. Id.
53. Id. at 1287. The 1982-1985 television plan is the one at issue in NCAA. The
A. The Decision of the District Court
After a long trial, the federal district court held the NCAA televi-
sion plan violated the Sherman Act.54 The district court issued many
findings of fact, all of them adverse to the NCAA. The court also
held the NCAA had violated section one of the Sherman Act under
both the per se and rule of reason approach. Under section two of
the Act, the court held that the NCAA had participated in boycotts
and monopolization. The district court rejected the NCAA's justifica-
tion of the plan and concluded that the NCAA was a "classic cartel
• . . [with] almost absolute control over the supply of college football
... "5 The court enumerated the NCAA's restraints as: 1) price
fixing; 2) exclusivity contracts which equaled a group boycott; 3) the
threat of sanctions against its own subentities which equaled a
threatened boycott; and 4) an artificial limit placed on the number of
games televised.56 The district court maintained a strictly commer-
cial viewpoint through the decision.5 7 It stated that "the Court's duty
is to restore competition to this monopolized industry. . . . Congress
has determined that free competition will yield this result and that
therefore competition shall be the rule of commerce in our nation."5 8
B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings of fact
CFA-NBC plan was never consummated. The majority of the CFA schools decided to
stay with the NCAA plan. 546 F. Supp. at 1287.
54. 546 F. Supp. at 1276. The court's decision was a lengthy 52 pages.
55. Id. at 1300-01.
56. Id. at 1281-82.
57. Id. Sometimes judges are good economists and sometimes they are not. Ac-
cordingly, fact finding which is inexorably linked with a particular economic perspec-
tive (or lack of one) may be suspect. As Judge Bork has stated, most judges are poor
economists and many "[c]ooperative ventures ... are outlawed through a misapplica-
tion of the sound policy against price fixing and market division .... The Court has
done these things, moreover, on demonstrably erroneous notions of the economics that
guide the law." R. BORK, supra note 15, at 4.
Judge Burciaga attempted to analyze a complex factual situation without ever stat-
ing the economic theory he was relying on. Some of his analysis is clearly circular.
Discussing horizontal controls, Judge Burciaga wrote: "[T]he networks are actually
paying the large fees because the NCAA agrees to limit production. If the NCAA
would not agree to limit production, the networks would not pay so large a fee." 546 F.
Supp. at 1294. The first statement is a positive statement, yet clearly a conclusion.
The second statement only restates the first dispositively and does not provide any
support for the conclusion. Judge Burciaga went on to write:
It is clear from the evidence that were it not for the NCAA controls, many
more college football games would be televised. This is particularly true at
the local level . . . and the evidence is clear that local broadcasts of college
football would occur far more frequently were it not for the NCAA controls.
Id. at 1294. Circular reasoning is a good indicator of a lack of argumentative basis.
Judge Burciaga has concluded that an open market is best for college football, but he
has no economic basis to support his reasoning.
58. 546 F. Supp. at 1328.
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and law.59 It found the district court's complex factual analysis cor-
rect and did not agree with the NCAA that ceitain facts were errone-
ous. The appellate court agreed that the NCAA had violated the
Sherman Act under both the per se rule and the rule of reason.
However, it did not affirm the district court's findings of section two
violations. The court did not find a boycott or monopolization. The
appellate court also limited the scope of the original injunction and
remanded the injunction order to the district court for
reconsideration.6 0
Although the majority did not find any of NCAA's justifications
for its controls compelling, the dissent presented an issue which is
basic to the controversy in this case. The dissent's view was similar
to the majority of the NCAA's voting members. The dissent argued
that the majority's view of intercollegiate football "not only as a busi-
ness, but as a 'pot of gold' business for those colleges and universities
which have consistently recruited top athletes in keeping with their
institutional priority of attaining athletic excellence," was errone-
ous.6 1 The dissent found that the NCAA had not violated the Sher-
man Act, and that under the rule of reason the NCAA controls were
procompetitive.62
C The Decision of the United States Supreme Court
Recognizing that this case involved a novel situation for the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act,63 Justice White stayed the judgment of
the court of appeals. 64 The Supreme Court granted the writ of certi-
orari,65 and on June 27, 1984, affirmed the appellate court's decision
holding that the NCAA's television plan violated section one of the
Sherman Act.66
59. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 1147-62.
61. Id. at 1165 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1162-68 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, 675 F.2d at 502.
64. 104 S. Ct. at 2948.
65. Id.
66. Id. The 1982-1985 television plan provided for a minimum aggregate fee of
$131,750,000.00 per network per four years. Except for the differences between prices
based on division status, the prices were set per game. There were "appearance re-
quirements" which limited the number of appearances per school. Turner Broadcast-
ing System (TBS) also had an exclusive cablecast contrnct for a minimum aggregate
fee for a two year period of $17,696,000.00. In 1981, a national telecast was worth
$600,000.00 and in 1980, a regional telecast was worth $426,779.00. Id. at 2956-57 & nn.
9-10.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court did not review the issue of section two viola-
tions. The petitioner did not raise two other issues previously re-
viewed: that the district court's fact finding was clearly erroneous,
and that the respondents did not suffer the type of injury that anti-
trust laws protect. The Court's analysis was primarily concerned
with which rule was to be applied to this somewhat unique case.67
A. Statutory Construction
The major substantive legal issue in this case was whether the
Court should use the per se approach or the rule of reason. The
Court stated that the test to determine whether the per se rule
should be applied is, "when the practice facially appears to be one
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output."68 The Court agreed with the lower court's findings
that the NCAA restraints were per se violations, but refrained from
applying the per se rule.69
The Court strategically did not preclude the possibility that the per
se rule could have been, and in the future could be, applied in similar
cases. The Court stated that, "Our analysis of this case under the
Rule of Reason, of course, does not change the ultimate focus of our
inquiry. Both per se rules and the Rule of Reason are employed 'to
form a judgment about the competitive significance of the re-
straint.' "70 The Court stressed that the Sherman Act necessitated an
inquiry into "whether or not the challenged restraint enhances com-
petition."71 This inquiry was then made under the rule of reason.
The Court applied the rule of reason because the NCAA structure
was a novel type of industry and thus merited further discussion of
NCAA controls in light of the relevant market.72 The NCAA prac-
tices were considered on two bases: "1) on the nature or character of
the contracts, or 2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the
inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade
and enhance prices."73 Therefore, the Court allowed itself to discuss
67. Id. at 2959-67.
68. Id. at 2960 (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20).
69. 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
70. Id. at 2962 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692) (em-
phasis omitted).
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2962. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.
Ct. 1551 (1984).
72. 104 S. Ct. at 2961 ("what is critical is that this case involves an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be avail-
able at all"). See supra note 11.
73. 104 S. Ct. at 2962. Although it has been in existence for over 70 years, the rule
of reason is not based on a set of clearly determinable standards. Under the rule of
reason the plaintiff must show the practices are unreasonable; the defendant is not re-
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the NCAA's justifications of its practices, even though it could not re-
view the factual basis upon which the NCAA regulations were held
illegal.7 4
B. Application of the Rule of Reason
Having stated that its basic focus was whether or not the chal-
lenged restraints enhanced competition, the Court restricted its rea-
sonableness analysis to economic factors. 75 The Court recognized
that the NCAA practices, when viewed in the framework of tradi-
tional business markets, were per se violations, but allowed the appli-
cation of the rule of reason due to the uniqueness of the college
football market.76 The rule of reason exists, as the Court recognized,
to allow for justifications for the restrictive practices to be presented.
However, in this case, the NCAA justifications are inherently tied to
purely noncommercial benefits, such as the pres;ervation of amateur-
ism and educational standards. By limiting its discussion to the
NCAA trade restraints versus the NCAA's commercial justifications
for the restraints, the Court precluded its analysis from truly testing
the long range effect of the restrictions. Because the NCAA is not a
purely commercial entity, an analysis of it in terms of strict economic
policy considerations does not effectively utilize the balancing test
provided by the reasonableness standard.7 7 The rule of reason was
used because the Court implicitly realized that NCAA could not be
considered a true industry. Once the Court allowed itself to use the
reasonableness standard, it ignored the very factors which compelled
quired to show its own practices are reasonable. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 15 (2d ed. 1984).
74. 104 S. Ct. at 2959 n.15 ("In accord with our usual practice, we must now accord
great weight to a finding of fact which has been made by a district court and approved
by a court of appeals"). See supra note 56. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-
23 (1982).
75. 104 S. Ct. at 2963-70. The dissent noted that "[t]he Court of Appeals, like the
District Court, flatly refused to consider what it termed 'noneconomic' justifications
.... This view was mistaken .... " Id. at 2978. The lower courts interpreted the
Court's decision in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 679, as precluding
analysis of the NCAA's noneconomic goals. 104 S. Ct. at 2978.
76. 104 S. Ct. at 2967. See supra note 72.
77. The CFA's argument that, "[n]either the issue nor the answer changes simply
because the question arises in the context of intercollegiate athletics," seems to have
been adopted by the Court. Brief for Respondent at 12, 104 S. Ct. at 2948. However,
the dissent and other commentators have stressed that the Court's previous decisions
do not preclude the use of noneconomic justifications when applying the rule of rea-
son. See supra note 72. See Note, supra note 41, at 655 ("[NCAA] differs from ordi-
nary cartels").
the use of the standard.78 Instead, it turned to commercial justifica-
tions which, because they are inherently linked to findings of fact
that have already been determined in the lower courts, truly re-
quired no further review.
The Court found that the television plan failed the rule of reason.
The plan raised price and reduced output. The NCAA did not sus-
tain its burden of establishing that the plan's anticompetitive effects
were justified.79 The NCAA argued that it had no market power and
therefore no ability to control supply and demand. This presented
two issues, one legal and one factual. Because the district court had
previously determined that output and price were controlled by the
NCAA, the factual question had already been examined.80 However,
the Court went on to define the substantive requirements the NCAA
failed to meet. The Court stated: "We have never required proof of
market power in such a case. This naked restraint on price and out-
put requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a
detailed market analysis."8' Again the Court precluded the rule of
reason from full application.
First, it does not require an exclusive market analysis. Because
market power is a factor in determining reasonableness of control
and can only be determined by an extensive market analysis, lack of
such analysis would lead to a determination that "the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output."8 2 This was the Court's
definition of the per se rule. The Court did, in fact, apply a per se
test under the guise of the rule of reason.
The Court, nevertheless, considered the NCAA's justifications.
Again, any commercial justification given by the NCAA was tied to
fact finding which had previously been determined adverse to the
NCAA. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Court did not find any
of the justifications compelling. The NCAA argued that its television
plan was a joint venture and therefore procompetitive.83 The Court
held that because the district court's finding "that the NCAA's televi-
sion [plan] reduces the volume of television rights sold," the
78. For a general discussion of the applicability of the rule of reason to NCAA
practices, see J. WEISTART, supra note 42, at § 5.12(c). "[M]ost NCAA regulations will
be evaluated under a rule of reason standard which allows judicial deference to be paid
to the noncommercial goals . . . the professed justification will be related to the desir-
ability of promoting and protecting a system of educationally related amateur athlet-
ics." Id. at § 5.12.
79. 104 S. Ct. at 2967. But see supra note 73.
80. 546 F. Supp. at 1294.
81. 104 S. Ct. at 2965 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 2960 (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20).
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2967.
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"NCAA's efficiency justification is not supported by the record."84
The Court next considered the NCAA's assertion that the television
plan protects live attendance. The Court noted that "the District
Court found no evidence to support that theory."8 5
Finally, the Court rejected the NCAA's assertion that its controls
maintained a competitive balance among the football teams. The
Court stated:
It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA
are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams
and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercol-
legiate athletics. The specific restraints on football telecasts that are chal-
lenged in this case do not, however, fit into the same mold as do rules defining
the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of participants, or the manner in
which members of a joint enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the
benefits of the total venture.8 6
The Court's rationale for differentiating the types of regulations
promulgated by the NCAA to preserve competitive balance was that
they did not "fit into the same mold" of other regulations.8 7 This
reasoning and the reasoning supporting the determination to apply
the rule of reason is opaque and unsupported. All of the NCAA's
regulatory controls, if viewed in a purely commercial way, have eco-
nomic effects. Many facets of football are limited, as is compensation
for athletes.8 8 The differences between fixing athletic compensation
and fixing a telecast price is one of monetary value, not economic ef-
fect. The Court's reasoning that one regulation does not "fit into the
same mold" of another is not particularly helpful.
The Court considered one type of regulation procompetitive "be-
cause [it] enhance[s] public interest in intercollegiate athletics."8 9
Procompetitiveness, however, had been previously defined by the
Court as rendering the relevant market more efficient.9 0 The Court
refrained from any mention of noncommercial factors such as public
interest. 91 Here the Court used public interest to help support its dif-
ferentiation argument. To say one thing is different than another by
using criteria inconsistent with the criteria used in the previous find-
ing creates a fallacious argument. This type of reasoning may be due
84. Id. at 2968 (emphasis in original). Thus, the plan was not necessary to enable
the NCAA to use an attractive package sale to pierce the market.
85. Id. at 2968 & n.56.
86. Id. at 2969.
87. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., J. WEISTART, supra note 42, at § 5.12.
89. 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
90. Id. at 2961.
91. See supra note 75.
to the fact that the Court was trying to analyze what it has termed a
unique product as if it were in the normal realm of commerce. Its
reasoning was therefore occasionally irreconcilable with the basic
tenets it follows.
C. Dissent
Justice White92 began his dissent by stating that the majority's
main error was "treating intercollegiate athletics under the NCAA's
control as a purely commercial venture in which colleges and univer-
sities participate solely, or even primarily, in the pursuit of profits."93
The dissent, unlike the majority, did not need to use convoluted rea-
soning to distinguish one regulation from another because it found no
basis to differentiate between them. Justice White aptly stated the
basic dilemma of the Court's holding. The true problem was that
"the Court trap[ped] itself in commercial antitrust rhetoric and ideol-
ogy and ignore[d] the context in which the restraints have been im-
posed."94 The relevant market to be examined (as restated in the
words of appellate court Judge Barrett) is not a market of "purely
competitive commercialism" in which the NCAA's education goals
should be subjugated.95
Justice White disputed both the lower court's factual and legal
holdings. When examining the district court's market analysis Jus-
tice White agreed with the NCAA's measure of market output.96
The NCAA determined output to be total games televised. Justice
White made the parallel argument concerning the definition of the
relevant market. Whereas the NCAA argued the market was all tel-
evision entertainment, the district court determined the market to be
televised college football.
The district court's ruling was based on the premise that, once de-
regulated, an open market will produce greater output.9 7 Justice
92. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's dissenting opinion. 104 S. Ct. at 2971
(White, J., dissenting). Justice White was himself a former All-American halfback
(and a Rhodes Scholar).
93. Id. at 2971.
94. Id. at 2974.
95. Id. at 2977. Justice White noted that the majority did not completely preclude
noneconomic factors from its analysis. The majority at one point discussed public in-
terest. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The dissent criticized the majority's
discussion of public interest because "[biroadly read, these statements suggest that
noneconomic values like the promotion of amateurism and fundamental educational
objectives could not save the television plan from condemnation under the Sherman
Act." Id. at 2978. This is misleading because the statements were "made in response to
'public interest' justifications proffered in defense of a ban on competitive bidding im-
posed by practitioners engaged in standard, profit-motivated commercial activities."
Id.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2975.
97. Id. See supra note 57.
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White's analysis showed that this is only true if output equals tele-
vised games. The district court itself stated tha total viewership will
probably decline as less games are televised nationally and more
games are televised locally and regionally.98 The central question
can be posed as whether "consumer welfare" is better served when
more games are televised but less people see them, or when less
games are televised and more people see them. Again, basic defini-
tions provide different answers. Because the majority and the lower
courts used purely commercial definitions, an economic benefit, that
is, more product (televised games) at less cost (per game), is the most
efficient, and therefore the most procompetitive. Under the dissent-
ing opinion and the NCAA view, the benefit was measured in both
commercial and educational goals. Therefore, more product (viewer-
ship) at less cost (no loss of amateurism by setting a minimum fee
and then redistributing the money among all the schools), is the most
procompetitive approach.
Justice White also found the district court'" (and majority opin-
ion's) rulings on the prices paid for particular games under the mini-
mum aggregate fee "erroneous as a matter of law." 99 In Justice
White's opinion, the minimum aggregate fee is a justifiable aspect of
maintaining competitive balance. Justice White found the NCAA's
"redistribution" of funds wholly necessary.lOO However, he did not
address the manner in which the redistribution occurs. The respon-
dents would undoubtedly agree that redistribution was fair if an
Oklahoma-USC game did not pay the same as a Citadel-Appalachian
State game.101 The majority argument that a free market would pro-
vide equitable prices should have been discussed here. Justice White
found the district court's emphasis on prices paid per game errone-
ous, but he did not discuss the equity or inequity of the "redistribu-
tion" of the fees paid per game as described above, stating "this
aspect of the plan should be of little concern.1 02 It was this concern
specifically, if any, which created the lawsuit.103 If Oklahoma and
Georgia had not felt that they were being paid too little per game,
they would never have brought this lawsuit.
98. 546 F. Supp. at 1307.
99. 104 S. Ct. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. See 546 F. Supp. at 1293.
102. 104 S. Ct. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 47.
103. See 546 F. Supp. at 1282 ("Football is the only sport sponsored by Oklahoma
which actually generates revenue .... As a result, Oklahoma seeks to maximize its
revenues from football television").
The dissent provided the NCAA with guidelines for its future tele-
vision plan. "[T]he NCAA may not limit the number of games that
are broadcast . . .and . . .it may not contract for an overall price
.... 104 Justice White emphasized that the majority did not disal-
low: 1) NCAA requirements to pool compensation and redistribute it
among NCAA members; 2) limitation of the number of times any
member may have its game televised; and 3) NCAA enforcement of
blackout rules to avoid direct competition among games. 0 5 Conse-
quently, if the NCAA does not set a minimum aggregate price for its
games as a package, and if it does not set a limit on the amount of
games it will sell, it should be able to continue regulating college
football telecasts.
V. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT
The focus of the Sherman Act is to provide for consumer wel-
fare.106 Perhaps the only beneficial effect of the holding in this case
has been to provide more football coverage on television and cable
networks.1 07 Whether more viewers are being exposed to televised
games is questionable. More local and regional games are being tele-
vised and network coverage remains about the same. Cablecasts have
increased, and even the Public Broadcasting System is televising Ivy
League games.108 To truly measure the impact of the holding it is
necessary to look individually at the groups involved.
A. The NCAA
The Supreme Court ruling eradicated the NCAA's major source of
funding.109 At the time of the holding, the NCAA stood to lose five
million dollars. But perhaps more importantly, the NCAA lost its
most powerful punitive tool.11o Losing the ability to regulate football
104. 104 S. Ct. at 2974 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Id. These requirements largely conform to the requirements placed on profes-
sional football. Professional football is allowed to blackout games in certain areas. See
J. WEISTART, supra note 42, at § 5.
106. See H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 164.
107. Taaffe, A Supremely Unsettled Smorgasbord, SPORTS ILLUS., Sept. 5, 1984, at
150.
108. Id.
109. Taaffe, The Supreme Court's TV Ruling: Will the Viewer Benefit Most?,
SPORTS ILLUS., July 9, 1984, at 9 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court killed a four-year 263.5 million
[dollar] deal the NCAA signed in 1982 with ABC and CBS, as well as a two-year 11.1
million [dollar] arrangement signed last May with ESPN").
110. L.A. Daily J., July 11, 1984, at 4, col. 1 ("the main restraint on exploitative
recruiting and betrayal of academic standards-the banishment from television-will
disappear"). This has already been the case concerning the University of Southern
California. The NCAA gave USC one of the most severe penalties in its history.
USC's offenses included selling athletes' complimentary tickets for them and then
compensating the players. USC announced it would defy the television ban imposed
under the NCAA television plan because the plan had been invalidated by the Court's
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telecasts also means no coherent national plan. Among the benefits
of a national plan are coordination between the football conferences,
individual schools and balanced nationwide coverage."' The benefits
of allowing the NCAA to supply a national plan are the existing
NCAA structure and its predominance in amateur athletics.
Overall, the NCAA's regulatory program has been severely under-
mined. Because the Court did not consider the NCAA's attempts to
preserve amateurism and educational goals, it sent a message that
college football is a professional industry. With this type of sanction
by the courts, the colleges with major athletic programs will feel free
to challenge any economic infringement by the NCAA.112 Now that
the universities control their own purse strings, their adherence to a
plan such as the NCAA's to perserve amateurism and educational
priorities is doubtful.
B. The Universities
The Supreme Court's deregulation of college football telecasts has
had the most profound effect on the universities. The respondents,
Oklahoma and Georgia, are exemplary of the larger, major football
playing powers. The respondents undoubtedly believed they would
make much more money without the NCAA plan, but this has yet to
occur. Ratings have dropped and the networks ire paying less. Local
and regional broadcasts have greatly increased the number of games
being televised, but this revenue is less than the amount the schools
are losing per game from the low network prices. One commentator
has stated that the major schools are making about the same amount
they made under the NCAA plan.113
If the major schools are making the same amount in an independ-
ent structure which does not redistribute revenue to smaller schools,
then logically the smaller schools are making less. For smaller
schools the result has been a chaotic scrambling, for air time. Schools
have been televised about fifty percent more, but have received ap-
holding. The ban cost USC $600,000 for the 1983 season. Crowe, USC to Defy NCAA
Football TV Ban, L.A. Times, June 30, 1984, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
111. The holding created such chaos among the schools, "that by the week's end
the 105 colleges in Division I-A were attempting to cede back some of their new free-
dom to an umbrella group that would serve as their bargaining agent: either the
NCAA again, or the College Football Association. Crowe, supra note 110, § 3, at
1, col. 1.
112. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
113. Cooper, Smaller Schools See No Dollars or Sense, L.A. Times, June 28, 1984,
§ 3, at 14, col. 1.
proximately fifty percent less revenue. 114 This may have a major ef-
fect on the schools' athletic programs. While the major football
schools are building "super conferences," the smaller schools will be
cutting some sports altogether.
Of course, the athletes now have a much greater influence over a
team's success, directly and indirectly. A star player means winning
and winning means entertainment value, i.e., dollars. When an indi-
vidual player has that much clout, recruiting players becomes both
essential and expensive. 115 Coaches have not been particularly dili-
gent about educational values in the past, and it is doubtful they will
be more diligent now that the NCAA standards have been emascu-
lated.116 College football may have become minor league football,
where players are groomed for the NFL or USFL.
C. The Broadcasting Companies
The broadcasters were the big winners as a result of the Court's
holding. ABC and CBS last year paid sixty-two and a half million
dollars, this year they will pay twenty million.117 It is largely the
lack of exclusivity and the increased supply which has driven the
price down. Ratings have also been dropping; therefore, the net-
works can be choosy over which teams they will broadcast. The ma-
jor networks help to perpetuate the "super football powers" like
Oklahoma and Georgia. The cablecasters have entered the market
with a flourish, as has PBS. All of the broadcasters anticipate profits
this year whereas, in the past, under the NCAA plan, the major net-
works lost seven million dollars annually.118
VI. THE LEGAL IMPACT
Clyde Murchmore, counsel for the University of Oklahoma,
114. Taaffe, supra note 107, at 151.
115. A good example of the clout players carry is the effect Boston College's Heis-
man trophy winner Doug Flutie has had on the team's television coverage and rank-
ing. "Flutie, who in three years has brought the Eagles out of the dark ages in football
• . . will be on national T.V. at least three times .... Last season four regular-season
TV appearances earned Boston College 1,585,000 [dollars]." Id. Boston College was
ranked in the top 15 schools this year, with Flutie a senior. Next year's rankings and
television revenue should be quite a bit lower.
116. L.A. Daily J., July 11, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
[S]tatistics indicate that far too many students who participate in college ath-
letics, especially football and basketball, never graduate-a sign that too many
coaches are less concerned with educating student athletes than they are with
providing a "good product for the marketplace," to quote the revealing phrase
that a University of Oklahoma attorney used after the Supreme Court's
ruling.
Id.
117. Taaffe, supra note 107, at 151.
118. Id.
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warned the CFA that under the holding "there is no plan you enter
into that comes with an absolute signed, sealed and delivered guaran-
tee that the courts aren't going to fuss with it."119 The major rele-
vance this case has is in its application to sports leagues and possibly
other nonprofit organizations with similar structures. First, the court
viewed the NCAA as a cartel. Therefore, the ,single entity defense is
largely unpersuasive for other sports leagues. Second, the Court ap-
plied the rule of reason which means a more lenient view of coopera-
tive economic regulation. Third, the rule of reason allows
justifications for the regulations to be made. If a league's regulations
are proven to be procompetitive they will be allowed. The idea that a
restriction may be procompetitive is one that will largely influence
future cases. The Court defined procompetitive as promoting effi-
ciency, therefore, the definition of what practices are efficient will be
central to future antitrust policy. 120
VII. CONCLUSION
This case has not yet ended.121 The NCAA has been remanded to
the district court and is attempting to have a new plan approved. If
Judge Burciaga of the district court hands down another adverse de-
cision, the NCAA could possibly appeal the new decision, claiming
the new plan conforms to the Supreme Court guidelines. Consider-
119. L.A. Times, June 29, 1984, § 3, at 12, col. 1. The irony in the statement is ap-
parent. Oklahoma and Georgia may be free of the NCAA, but they now face their own
antitrust problems. Some organization has occurred since the chaotic situation in
June. The major football conferences have signed with football television "packagers"
who then sell their rights to the national and local networks. Because there are five or
six different packagers, there is no coordination among them concerning intra-confer-
ence games. For example, UCLA, USC, the Pacific 10 and the Big Ten conferences
had filed suit against ABC, ESPN, the CFA, Nebraska and Notre Dame, because
UCLA had assured its network, CBS, that CBS would be televising the Nebraska-
UCLA game. The problem centered on the fact that CFA teams had sold exclusive
rights to ABC and ESPN. L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1984, § 3, at 3, col. 4. The issue was
settled out of court.
120. For a general discussion of efficiency, how it is analyzed and its future role in
antitrust policy, see R. BORK, supra note 15.
121. Telephone interview with Jack Waters, Director of Marketing and Promotion,
NCAA (Sept. 7, 1984). The NCAA filed a motion to modify the injunction on July 3,
1984, in Oklahoma District Court under Judge Burciaga. On September 1, a joint con-
ference was held with counsel for the NCAA, University of Oklahoma and University
of Georgia. On November 2, Judge Burciaga issued a clarification of the original in-
junction order. He affirmed the NCAA's ability to use the restriction of television
rights as a punitive tool. It is still unclear how the NCAA may control television
rights economically. Because economic control has not been settled, the ability to use
the restriction of television appearances as punishment has no effect. L.A. Times, Nov.
3, 1984, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
ing the district court's previous holding, the NCAA has a long battle
ahead.
Promoting amateurism seems contrary to the American capitalistic
ideal. But some cases call for a long steady look at professionalism
before it is thrust upon them. Universities have within their halls
many potential money-making resources, from sports to scientific re-
search. Even though fear of commercialism seems old fashioned, it is
altruistic. Universities must aim to provide a solid educational base
for their students. Ostensibly, students go to school for an education,
not for national network coverage and a million dollar professional
football contract. College sports teams should not be training
grounds for super athletes just as universities should not operate as
commercial industries. Nevertheless, the reality exists that some-
times money is the name of the game.
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